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Abstract—Modern automotive platforms are cyber-physical in
nature and increasingly connected. Cybersecurity testing of such
platforms is expensive and carries safety concerns, making it
challenging to perform tests for vulnerabilities and refine test
methodologies. We propose a testbed, built over a Controller Area
Network (CAN) simulator, and validate it against a real-world
demonstration of a weakness in a test vehicle using aftermarket
On Board Diagnostic (OBD) scanners (dongles).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a well established,
fault tolerant and reliable communications system, widely used
for command and control in cars. It is designed for data
transmission between Electronic Control Units (ECUs) used
throughout a vehicle. However, CAN was designed prior to
the widespread introduction of vehicular wireless interfaces.
There is highly cited research [1], [2] on the cybersecurity
vulnerabilities of the wireless interfaces, CAN and ECUs in
vehicles. The research has increased the interest in hunting
for vulnerabilities in automobile systems, however, it has
given vehicle manufacturers a new testing problem. Research
by the Cybersecurity Group at Coventry University, along
with vehicle testing specialists HORIBA MIRA, is addressing
automotive security testing.
II. PROBLEM DEFINITION
Vehicle manufacturers can no longer regard their products
as isolated systems, due to the wireless and sensor connectivity
of the modern car. This connectivity adds a safety consid-
eration, can a vehicle manufacturer ensure their cars remain
safe when subjected to cyber attacks? Such interfaces are
susceptible to abuse by malicious adversaries. To mitigate this,
controls and countermeasures need to be introduced, but it is
necessary to target where and how these might be placed. This
is informed in part through testing for vulnerabilities.
Comprehensive safety design and functional testing of
vehicle systems is part of the normal life cycle of a car [3].
However, the new cybersecurity threat to connected vehicles
means manufacturers must test for a vehicle’s cyber attack
resilience. Organisations have begun to address this issue with
the J3061 guidelines [4]. Despite this, research tends to be
directed toward finding vulnerabilities and little is directed
towards the practicalities of automotive cybersecurity testing.
The testing of computer systems that form a major part of
vehicle functionality can be automated. Automated tests usu-
ally look for the presence of specified behaviours, rather than
the absence of undesirable ones [5]. Therefore, the discovery
of novel or lateral flaws would need a study of a real system,
since cybersecurity weaknesses are hard to foresee in both
design and implementation; this would usually mean testing
real vehicles. The very nature of vehicles (high purchase
cost, technical complexity, physical size) makes cybersecurity
testing costly in terms of both time and physical resources.
Luxury cars are of most interest as they have the highest
number and sophistication of computerised systems. However,
financial restrictions might mean that older model vehicles or
components are used instead [1], [2]. This adversely affects
security research as countermeasures and test methodologies
that are developed could be obsolete, incomplete, or inappro-
priate. With these factors in mind how do interested parties
efficiently test cars for cybersecurity vulnerabilities?
III. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION
The complexity of automotive systems has long necessi-
tated hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) test equipment to provide
an environment for out of vehicle design, development and
testing. HIL has recently been used to experiment with combi-
natorial testing of automotive control systems [6]. The arrival
of connected and autonomous vehicles (CAV) increases the
component count in vehicles, and thus the challenge is to
maintain the security of the composite system.
This initial case study uses a commercial HIL tool re-
purposed as a cybersecurity testbed. The results indicate that
a simulation solution is viable. To validate the assertion that
a HIL tool is suitable for cybersecurity testing, the testbed
was used to evaluate a security threat from dongles as applied
to a real vehicle. It is important for research to address the
increasing testing complexity presented by CAVs and access to
such testbeds can aid the implementation of J3061 guidelines.
A. Case Study
The legally mandated OBD port provides a direct connec-
tion to a car’s CAN bus to provide diagnostic data. Dongles
connect to the OBD port, facilitating data communication
with a car’s systems. Vehicle data available through the OBD
port is neither encrypted nor typically access controlled. This
case study used OBD dongles for several reasons: first, prior
research has shown that compromise through the OBD port
is a real possibility [7]. Secondly, many studies consider the
OBD port to be a viable target, both through wired [1] and
wireless [8] means. Thirdly, remote access to the OBD port
increases the security risk as the adversary does not have to
be physically present within the vehicle cabin [9]. Finally,
the OBD dongles themselves have little security [8]. An
experiment in this research, performed on a small hatchback
from a major manufacturer, confirmed the existing threats to
vehicles via such dongles.
Five OBD dongles were connected in turn to the real
test vehicle. Each dongle was used to test message injection
into the vehicle’s internal CAN bus. The vehicle produced
errors and undesirable behaviours when non-standard diagnos-
tic messages were introduced. Non-diagnostic CAN messages
were also injected directly and accepted by the vehicle. The
CAN message definitions for a vehicle are usually confidential,
however, messages that have an effect on the vehicle can be
reverse engineered given time and access to the vehicle. The
ease of message injection from an external source highlights
the essential need for security testing by vehicle manufacturers.
The risk is also increased because the injections can happen
from outside the vehicle, demonstrating that cars can no longer
be considered as closed boxes.
B. Testbed
The testbed must be capable of faithfully reproducing
the behaviour of a vehicle network. A commercially avail-
able compact, real-time, CAN simulator by Vector Informatik
GmbH was used. The CAN data traffic can be monitored,
captured and analysed, useful for the reverse engineering of
a vehicle. The CAN simulator can operate in HIL or stand
alone configurations allowing for both ECU and CAN network
simulation development without the need to have access to
a vehicle. The developed simulation also mitigates the risks
(such as potential damage to the vehicle) involved in security
testing. The principle operation of the CAN simulator is based
around descriptive databases that provide a virtual model of ve-
hicles. Databases of in-production cars are difficult to acquire,
however, the functional equivalent can be reverse engineered.
The Vector simulator and software (CANoe) is an established
industry tool and therefore capable of producing an accurate
model. The testbed is validated based on its capabilities and
mechanisms for vehicle systems development and testing.
A vehicle simulation is configured on the testbed. A
Bluetooth-enabled dongle is connected to an OBD port on
the simulator (via a custom made cable with external power
to replicate the vehicle power). An unauthorised pairing with
the dongle is performed. We then inject a CAN message that
affects an aspect of our simulated vehicle in an undesirable
manner. Messages could be injected via the aftermarket device
into our model system and we were able to turn the headlights
on and off (thus achieving undesirable behaviour), although
the headlight in our simulation “flickered”. This is similar to
the real world demonstration, where sending the message once
caused the vehicle’s electronics to flicker once. This is caused
by the fact that our message had to contend with continuously
generated ‘true’ messages from the attendant ECUs; behaviour
that our simulation also displayed. Additionally, we only
configured the head light to respond. However, by creating
and linking other nodes together within our simulation, it is
possible to increase the complexity of the testbed functionality.
IV. DISCUSSION
Performing a cyber attack on a real vehicle and then the
simulator has given confidence to the ongoing research project,
aimed at improving vehicle cyber defenses. Having a vehicle
simulator to study attacks and countermeasures has the advan-
tage of reducing costs (material and time) and providing a safe
environment to test techniques. The use of equipment common
in the industry validates the ability for manufacturers to begin
implementing the J3061 guidelines and bring secure design and
testing into existing engineering processes (designing security
into system from the beginning rather than retrofitting). The
primary concern is producing simulation with enough detail to
allow for simulation accuracy. This should not be an issue for
manufacturers as they have access to system design. A concern
for researchers who reverse engineer vehicle systems is the
possible omission of design subtleties. However, the testbed
will be developed to replicate real ECUs and vehicles with
enough detail for it to be a useful cybersecurity testing tool.
A. Further work
Whilst most vehicular cybersecurity research has been di-
rected towards revealing flaws, the cyber defensive capabilities
of cars must not be forgotten. The direction of our future
research does consider vehicle cyber defense. This involves
adding detail to the simulator, then investigating tests (for
attack and defense), analysing the properties of vehicular
firewalls, and investigating novel cyber defense solutions.
B. Presentation
The presentation adds further detail to the research aims,
tests and results. It provides additional information on the
operation and limitations of the CAN bus and discusses further
the cybersecurity threats to modern vehicles. The experiments
with the dongles are covered in greater depth and an overview
of simulator capabilities is given, showing how it can be used
for automating and performing security testing.
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